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A MISDIAGNOSIS AND AN IMPROPER PROSCRIPTION? 
CONCERNS AND CRITICISMS OF PROPOSED S~E .. C.. RULE 127B 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On April 16, 2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission C~SEC") filed securities 
fraud charges against Goldman, Sachs & Co. ("GS&Co") and a GS&Co employee, Fabrice 
Tourre ("Tourre"), for making material misrepresentations and omissions in connection with a 
synthetic collateralized debt obligation 1 (''CDO'') GS&Co structured and marketed to investors 
as the U.S. housing market was beginning to falter? 
The synthetic CDO that GS&Co structured and marketed hinged on the performance of 
subprime residential mortgage-backed securities3 ("RMBS").4 Allegedly, GS&Co failed to 
disclose vital information about the CDO to investors, in particular the role that a major hedge 
fund played in the portfolio selection process and that the same hedge fund had taken a short 
position5 against the CD0.6 
1 A CDO is a basket of assets or income streams that are pooled together, split into subordinated repayment rights 
("tranches")~ rated by a credit rating agency and sold to investors. The assets may consist of cash assets, such as 
bonds, loans, preferred securities, mortgages, or even tranches of other CDOs. When a CDO is created from a cash 
asset, it is called a "'cash CDO." Alternatively, a CDO may be created from income streams that result from a pool 
of credit default swaps, a type of derivative. When a CDO is created from credit default swaps instead of cash 
assets, it is called a ""synthetic CDO." Neal Deckant, Criticisms of Collateralized Debt Obligations in the Wake of 
the Goldman Sachs Scandal, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 407,410 (2010). 
2 SEC Litigation Release No. 21489, The SEC Charges Goldman Sachs With Fraud In Connection With The 
Structuring And Marketing of A Synthetic CDO (Apr. 16, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21489.htm (Apr. 16, 2010); See also Securities and Exchange 
Commission v. Goldman Sachs & Co. and Fabrice Tourre Complaint, available at 
http://www .sec.gov/litigation/ complaints/20 1 0/comp-pr20 1 0-59 .pdf. 
3 The SEC defines "mortgage-backed securities" as debt obligations that represent claims to the cash flows from 
pools of mortgage loans~ most commonly on residential property. See 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecLlfities.htm; see also SEC Complaint, supra at 5 (RMBS are securities 
backed by residential mortgages. Investors receive payments out of the interest and principal on the underlying 
mortgages). 
4 SEC Press Release, SEC Charges Goldman Sachs With Fraud in Structuring and .Arlarketing of CDO Tied to 
Subprime Mortgages (Apr. 16, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-59.htm. 
5 The SEC defines a ~'short position" as one resulting from "short sales." The SEC defines a "'short sale" as the sale 
of any security which the seller does not own or any sale which is consummated by the delivery of a security 
borrowed by, or for the account of, the seller. See http://www.sec.gov/answers/shortsale.htm. 
6 SEC Press Release~ supra note 4. 
"'The product was new and complex but the deception and conflicts are old and simple," 
said Robert Khuzami, Director of the Division of Enforcement.7 Khuzami also added, "Goldman 
wrongly permitted a client that was betting against the mortgage market to heavily influence 
which mortgage securities to include in an investment portfolio, while telling other investors that 
the securities were selected by an independent, objective third party."8 
The SEC alleged that one of the world's largest hedge funds, Paulson & Co. ("Paulson"), 
paid Goldman Sachs to structure a transaction in which Paulson could take short positions 
against mortgage securities chosen by Paulson based on a belief that the securities would 
. d" 9 10 expenence ere 1t events . 
According to the SEC's complaint, the marketing materials for the CDO, known as 
ABACUS 2007-AC 1 ("ABACUS"), all represented that the RMBS portfolio underlying the 
CDO was selected by ACA Management LLC ('"ACA"), a third party with expertise in analyzing 
credit risk in RMBS. 11 The SEC alleged that undisclosed in the marketing materials and 
unbeknownst to investors, the Paulson hedge fund, which was poised to benefit if the RMBS 
defaulted, played a significant role in selecting which RMBS should tnake up the portfolio. 12 
The complaint alleged that after participating in the portfolio selection, Paulson 
effectively shorted the RMBS portfolio it helped select by entering into credit default swaps 13 
7 Jd. 
8 !d. 
9 A '"credit event" is defined as any sudden and tangible (negative) change in a borrower's credit standing or decline 
in credit rating. A credit event brings into question the borrower's ability to repay its debt. It is the defining trigger 
in a credit derivative contract, or credit default swap. If the borrower experiences a credit event, then the buyer of 
the contract must pay the seller an agreed-upon sum to cover the loss. See 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/credit-event.asp#axzzl ewctQVOO. 
10 SEC Press Release, supra note 4. 
II Jd. 
12 Jd. 
13 A "credit default swap" is an over-the-counter derivative contract under which a protection buyer makes periodic 
premium payments and the protection seller makes a contingent payment if a reference obligation experiences a 
credit event. SEC Complaint, supra note 2, at 5. 
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("CDS") with GS&Co to buy protection on specific layers of the ABACUS capital structure. 14 
Given that financial short interest, Paulson had an economic incentive to select RMBS that it 
expected to experience credit events in the near future. 15 GS&Co did not disclose Paulson's 
short position or its role in the collateral selection process in the term sheet, flip book, offering 
memorandum, or other marketing materials provided to investors. 16 
The complaint further alleged that Tourre, a GS&Co Vice President, was principally 
responsible for ABACUS. 17 Tourre structured the transaction, prepared the marketing materials, 
and communicated directly with investors. 18 Tourre allegedly knew of Paulson's undisclosed 
short interest and role in the collateral selection process. 19 Additionally, he misled ACA into 
believing that Paulson invested approximately $200 miiiion in the equity of ABACUS, 
indicating that Paulson's interests in the col!atera! selection process were closely aligned with 
ACA's interests.Z0 However, in reality, their interests were sharply conflicting.21 
The deal closed on April 26, 2007, and Paulson paid GS&Co approximately $15 million 
for structuring and marketing ABACUS?2 By October 2007, 83 percent of the RMBS in the 
ABACUS portfolio had been downgraded and 17 percent were on negative watch?3 By January 
-"f\1\0 fil\ ________ .._ _ _('.._)_ _____ .._£"_1~. 1 .. 11 - 1 1 1 .. 1 1 ·- '1 1 ••• 24 • 
..::.vvo, 77 _IJci~.;,au u1 tuc puruuuu m:t.u o~;;~;;n uuwngrau~u anu ut:~Ignat~u a~ nt=any wunntess. AS 
14 SEC Press Release, supra note 4. 
15 !d. 
16 !d. 
17 Jd. 
18 Jd 
19 !d. 
20 SEC Press Release, supra note 4. 
21 Jd. 
22 Jd 
23 Jd. 
24 Jd. 
3 
a result, investors in the liabilities of ABACUS lost over $1 billion?5 Paulson's opposite CDS 
positions yielded a profit of approximately $1 billion for Paulson.26 
The SEC's complaint charged GS&Co and Tourre with violations of Section 17(a) of the 
Securities Act of 193327, Section 1 O(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193428 , and Exchange 
Act Rule 10b-529 .30 On July 15, 2010, the SEC announced that GS&Co would pay $550 million 
and reform its business practices to settle the charges.31 GS&Co agreed to settle the SEC's 
charges without admitting or denying the allegations by consenting to the entry of a final 
judgment that provides for a permanent injunction from violations of the antifraud provisions of 
the Securities Act of 1933.32 However, GS&Co did acknowledge that its marketing materials for 
the ABACUS transaction contained incomplete information.33 
In response to the settlement, SEC Enforcement Director Khuzami commented, ''[h]alf a 
billion dollars is the largest penalty ever assessed against a financial services firm in the history 
of the SEC . . . [t]his settlement is a stark lesson to Wall Street firms that no product is too 
complex, and no investor too sophisticated~ to avoid a heavy price if a firm violates the 
fundamental principles of honest treatment and fair dealing."34 
25 ld. 
26 SEC Litigation Release No. 21489, supra, note 2. 
27 15 U .S.C. §77q(a) ("the Securities Act"). 
28 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) C'the Exchange Act"). 
29 17 C.F .R. §240.1 Ob-5. 
30 SEC Press Release, supra note 4. 
31 SEC Press Release, Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle SEC Charges Related to Subprime 
lvfortgage CDO (July 15, 201 0), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/201 0/201 0-123.htm (the settlement 
requires remedial action by GS&Co in its review and approval of offerings of certain mortgage securities, including 
the role and responsibilities of internal legal counsel, compliance personnel, and outside counsel in the review of 
written marketing materials for such offerings. The settlement also requires additional education and training of 
GS&Co employees in this area of the firm's business). 
32 !d. (Tourre is litigating the charges against him.) 
33 !d. (GS&Co acknowledged that, in particular, it was a mistake for the GS&Co marketing materials to state that 
the reference portfolio was "selected by" ACA without disclosing that role of Paulson in the portfolio selection 
process and that Paulson's economic interests were adverse to CDO investors.) 
34 !d. 
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Subsequently, the SEC was directed by Section 621 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 201035 (''Dodd-Frank" or ''the Act") to promulgate 
rules to ensure that securitization participants of asset-backed securities36 ("ABS") shall not, for 
a year after the date of the closing of the ABS sale, engage in transactions that would involve or 
result in any material conflict of interest with respect to investors. 37 Just over one year after the 
GS&Co settlement, on September 19, 2011, the SEC unanimously agreed to propose a new rule, 
Rule 127B, which closely mirrors the language of Section 621.38 
Rule 127B is a product of crisis legislation, as such, it was misconceived and is 
improperly tailored; the proposal does not address the real failures underlying the fmancial 
mechanism in question, and, as proposed, may create unnecessary restrictions on asset-backed 
securitization markets and ¥viii be detrimental to the healthy functioning of the securitization 
markets. Part II offers an overview of the proposed rule, its origination, and the prohibition and 
exceptions it sets forth. Part II details the arguments posited by the proposed rule's supporters 
and critics. Next, Part III analyzes why the arguments in favor of the rule fail and provides an 
explanation of the real underlying problems regarding complex securitization transactions, which 
• 1 1 1 ~ ·"I I 1 1 ~ .. T"( T .. 1 J 1 ... 1 • ..1. 1 f"" 1. - 1 - .t Lnt= prupust;u rut~ 1aus to auun::s:s. ran 1 v (.;Ulltt:nus tnal oy HH.::urpuraung a run:: 1ur Ul:slau:sun:: 1.0 
the proposed rule, the potential harmful effects and undue cost of the proposed rule will be 
minimized. Part V follows with a conclusion. 
35 Public Law 111-203, §621, 124 Stat. 1376, 1632 (2010). 
36 The SEC defines "asset-backed security" as a security that pays its investors from cash flows from a discrete pool 
of financial assets such as mortgages. See 17 C.F.R. §229.110l(c)(l) (2008); Asset-Backed Securities, Exchange 
Act Release Nos. 33-8518, 34-50905, 84 SEC Docket 1624 (Dec. 22, 2004). 
37 Yin Wilczek, SEC Proposes Rule to Bar Transactions That Involve Conflicts for ABS Investors, BUREAU OF 
NATIONAL AFFAIRS ("BNA"), 43 SRLR 1941 (Sept. 26, 2011). 
38 Jd. 
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II. PROPOSED S.E.C. RULE 127B 
A. The Dodd-Frank Mandate 
Section 621 of Dodd-Frank adds new Section 27B to the Securities Act. Section 27B 
prohibits an underwriter, placement agent, initial purchaser, or sponsor, or any affiliate or 
subsidiary of any such entity, of an ABS, including a synthetic ABS, from engaging in a 
transaction that would involve or result in certain material conflicts of interest.39 The prohibition 
under Section 27B applies to both registered and unregistered offerings of ABS40 •41 The 
prohibition applies during the period ending on the date that is one year after the date of the first 
closing of the sale of the ABS.42 Exceptions from the prohibition are provided for certain risk-
mitigating hedging activities, liquidity commitments, and bona fide market-making.43 
Furthermore, Section 27B requires the SEC to issue rules for the purpose of imple1nenting the 
new Section's prohibition.44 To meet this statutory requirement, the SEC proposed Rule 127B 
under the Securities Act. 45 
"This rule is designed to ensure that those who create and sell asset-backed securities 
cannot profit by betting against those same securities at the expense of those who buy them," 
SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro said in her opening remarks at the September 19, 2011 SEC open 
meeting.46 "At the same time, the rule is not intended to interfere with traditional securitization 
practices in which loans are originated, packaged into asset-backed securities, and offered to 
39 SEC Release No. 34-65355, Prohibition Against Conflicts of Interest in Certain Securitizations (Sept. 19, 2011); 
76 FR 60320 (Sept. 28, 2011 ), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/20 ll/34-65355fr.pdf. 
40 ABS can be sold to investors in either a public offering, subject to an effective registration statement filed with the 
SEC, or a private offering exempt from registration. /d. at 60321. 
41 !d. at 60320. 
42 /d. 
43 /d. 
44 ld. 
45 /d. 
46 Wilczek, supra note 37; Speech available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch091911mls.htm. 
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investors in different structures."47 If the proposed rule had been in place earlier, it would have 
barred the alleged conduct by GS&Co and very similar conduct by other banks48•49 
B. The S.E .. C .. Proposal 
Proposed Rule 127B closely mirrors the language of Section 621.50 Under the proposed 
rule, 
(a) An underwriter, placement agent, initial purchaser, or sponsor, or any affiliate or 
subsidiary of any such entity, of an asset-backed security (as such term is defined 
in section 3 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, which for the purposes of 
this rule shall include a synthetic asset-backed security), shall not, at any time for 
a period ending on the date that is one year after the date of the first closing of the 
sale of the asset-backed security, engage in any transaction that would involve or 
result in any material conflict of interest with respect to any investor in a 
transaction arising out of such activity. 
(b) The following activities shall not be prohibited by paragraph (a): (1) Risk-
mitigating hedging activities,S 1 or (2) Liquidity commitment,5 or (3) Bona fide 
market-making. 53 
For the proposed rule to apply, five conditions must be present. The transaction must 
involve: (1) covered persons, (2) covered products, (3) covered timeframe, (4) covered conflicts, 
and (5) a "'material conflict of interest". 
47 ld. 
48 See SEC Litigation Release No. 22008, J.P. Morgan Securities to Pay $153.6 Million to Settle SEC Charges of 
Misleading Investors in CDO Tied to U.S. Housing Market (June 21, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/1itreleases/2011/lr22008.htm; See also SEC Litigation Release No. 22134, Citigroup 
To Pay $285 Million to Settle SEC Charges For 1\1/isleading Investors About CDO Company Profited From 
Proprietary Short Position Former Citigroup Employee Sued For His Role In Transaction (Oct. 19, 2011), available 
at http://www .sec.gov /litigation/litreleases/20 1 1 /1r22134.htm. 
49 Wilcze~ supra note 3 7. 
50 ld. 
51 Risk-mitigating hedging activities in connection with positions or holdings arising out of the underwriting, 
placement, initial purchase, or sponsorship of an asset-backed security, provided that such activities are designed to 
reduce the specific risks to the underwriter, placement agent~ initial purchaser, or sponsor associated with such 
positions or holdings. See 76 FR 60320, supra note 39, at 60333. 
52 Purchases or sales of asset-backed securities made pursuant to and consistent with commitments of the 
underwriter, placement agent, initial purchaser, or sponsor, or any affiliate or subsidiary of such entity, to provide 
liquidity for the asset-backed security. See id. at 60335. 
53 Purchases or sales of asset-backed securities made pursuant to and consistent with bona fide market-making in the 
asset-backed security. See id. at 60326. 
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It should be noted that, Rule 127B does not specifically set forth the types of conflicts it 
covers. However, the SEC proposes that the scope of the conflicts of interest covered by the new 
rule would be limited to: (1) conflicts of interest between an entity that is a securitization 
participant with respect to an ABS and an investor in such ABS, (2) conflicts of interest between 
a securitization participant and an investor that arise as a result of or in connection with the ABS 
transaction, and (3) conflicts of interest that arise as a result of or in connection with 
'"engage[ing] in any transaction."54 Also, Rule 127B would apply only to ''material conflicts of 
interest". But, the SEC does not define ''material conflict of interest". The release contains an 
SEC explanation that it is unwilling to set forth an explicit definition because of the possibility 
that any such attempt would be both under- and over-inclusive and result in unintended 
consequences. The SEC does note that certain conflict of interest are inherent in the 
securitization process, and does not intend to alter or curtail the legitimate functioning of the 
securitization markets. The SEC proposes to clarify the scope of conflicts of interest that are 
material through interpretive guidance rather than through a detailed definition in the proposed 
rule.55 
54 !d. at 60328. 
55 Preliminarily, the SEC believes that engaging in a transaction will involve or result in a material conflict of 
interest between a securitization participant and investors if: 
1. Either (A) a securitization participant would benefit directly or indirectly from the actual, anticipated 
or potential (I) adverse performance of the asset pool supporting or referenced by the relevant ABS, 
(II) loss of principal, monetary default or early amortization event on the ABS, or (III) decline in the 
market value of the relevant ABS; or (B) a securitization participant, who directly or indirectly controls 
the structure of the relevant ABS or the selection of assets underlying the ABS, would benefit directly 
or indirectly from fees or other forms of remuneration, or the promise of future business, fees, or other 
forms of remuneration, as a result of allowing a third party, directly or indirectly to structure the 
relevant ABS or select assets underlying the ABS in a way that facilitates or creates an opportunity for 
that third party to benefit from a short transaction as described in clause (A) above; and 
2. there is a "substantia] likelihood" that a "reasonable" investor would consider the conflict important to 
his or her investment decision (including a decision to retain the security or not). 
Jd at 60329. 
8 
Securities Act Section 27B does not contain a disclosure provision, and as-proposed, 
neither does Rule 127B.56 However, the SEC is seeking comment concerning the role of 
disclosure in the context of Securities Act Section 27B and the proposed rule. 57 Section 28 of the 
Securities Act provides the SEC with authority to adopt conditional and unconditional exemptive 
rules or regulations "'to the extent that such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest~ and is consistent with the protection of investors."58 The SEC is soliciting comment as 
to whether, in some circumstances, material conflicts of interest that would be prohibited under 
Section 27B and the proposed rule could be addressed sufficiently through a conditional 
exemption.59 Specifically, provided the SEC were able to make the findings required by 
Securities Act Section 28, the SEC could require disciosure, as a condition to an exemption, to 
allow securitization participants to engage in what othef'Nise ·would be prohibited behavior under 
Section 27B and the proposed rule. 60 
C. Support and Criticisms of the Proposal 
"In the aftermath of the financial crisis, it became clear that firms were creating financial 
products, selling those same products to their customers, and then turning around and making 
bets against ihose same products ihey just soid;~ said SEC Commissioner Luis Aguiiar in his 
speech at the SEC's open meeting on September 19, 2011.61 This practice equates to 
selling someone a car with no brakes and then taking out a life insurance policy 
on the purchaser. In the [ABS] context the sponsors and underwriters of the 
[ABS] are the parties who select and understand the underlying assets, and who 
are best positioned to design a security to succeed or fail . . . [the ABS sponsors 
and issuers], like the mechanic servicing a car, would know if the vehicle has 
been designed to fail. And so they must be prevented from securing handsome 
56 ld. at 60343. 
57 SEC Release, supra note 39, at 60343. 
58 Jd.; See 15 U.S.C. 77z-3. 
59 Id. 
60 !d. 
61 Speech by SEC Commissioner Luis Aguiiar, Statement at SEC Open Nfeeting: Prohibiting Firms from Designing 
Transactions to Fail (Sept. 19, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch09191llaa.htm. 
9 
rewards for designing and selling malfunctioning vehicles that undermine the 
[ABS] markets.62 
The proposed rule is an important step forward to prohibit this practice and to protect investors 
from being persuaded to invest in products designed to fail. 63 Section IV of the Proposed Rule 
raises the possibility of using information barriers and disclosures in lieu of a complete 
prohibition.64 Supporters of the rule would advise against this. Although some supporters may 
generally be in favor of using information barriers and disclosure to mitigate conflicts of interest, 
they would suggest that short transactions should be absolutely prohibited, absent an 
exemption.65 In the context of the Proposed Rule, supporters argue that, there must be a 
presumption that a material conflict of interest situation, where a securitization participant 
engages in a transaction through which it benefits when the related ABS fails or performs 
adversely, cannot be justified.66 
While superficially these positions in support of Rule 127B are persuasive, further 
analysis, of the transactions covered by the proposed rule and the prohibition set forth by the 
rule, reveals the potentially harmful and unintended consequences that the rule, as-proposed, 
may create for the securitization markets. 
Discourse exploded in the wake of the SEC v. GS&Co suit.67 Critics blatned CDOs for 
inflating the housing bubble and helping to bring about the recession, 68 credit rating agencies for 
62 /d. (citing Cong. Rec. S5899 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement by Sen. Levin)). 
63 !d. 
64 Chris Barnard, Comment on Prohibition against Conflicts of Interest in Certain Securitizations (Sept. 30, 201 1), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-38-ll/s73811-2.pdf. 
65 !d. 
66 !d. 
67 See Deckant, supra note 1. 
68 See Joel Nocera, A Wall Street Invention Let the Crisis !vlutate, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2010), available at 
http://www .nytimes.com/2 0 1 0/04/1 7/business/1 7nocera.html. 
10 
inflating CDO ratings/9 and originators and short sellers, like GS&Co and Paulson, for 
marketing synthetic CDOs that were expected to faif0 •71 Despite the large volume of discourse, 
few commentators discussed CDOs with any degree of technical clarity. 72 Likewise, a 
preliminary concern with Dodd-Frank, and the proposed rule mandated under it, is whether 
Congress itself understood the instruments and transactions with any degree of technical clarity 
or whether Congress was swayed by other factors before legislating. 
Following the recent housing bubble's burst, the subprime mortgage crisis, and the Great 
Recession, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act on July 21, 2010.73 A massive financial 
overhaul was promised with the signing of Dodd-Frank into law.74 One of the initiatives 
introduced by Dodd-Frank was, as discussed above, to temporarily bar ihose who package and 
distribute AB S from engaging in transactions that materially conflict with the interests of 
investors. However, given that some believe the passing of Dodd-Frank was motivated by 
populist outrage/5 the efficacy of the provisions mandated by the Act must be questioned. 
The dangers associated with post-crisis legislation and ''bubble laws" have been well 
documented. 76 The U.S. Congress is subject to national public opinion and populist 
69 See Robert Oak, Credit Ratings Agencies Complicit in Global Financial Casino Gambling Hall Dupe, 
ECONOMIST POPULIST (Apr. 23, 201 0). 
70 See Mark Trumbull, Goldman Sachs vs. SEC: "Vampire Squid" or "Doing God's Work"?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MONITOR (Apr. 21, 2010). 
71 Deckant, supra note 1, at 407-08. 
72 Jd. at 408; See Aline van Duyn, More Turmoil Looms in CDO Market, FINANCIAL TIMES (June 21, 2010) (simply 
referring to CDOs as "complex," offering few technical details about their structure or function). 
73 For an overview of the crisis, see RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE 
DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009). 
74 Matthew G. Lamoreaux, Obama Signs Dodd-Frank Reform Bill, J. OR ACCOUNTANCY (July 21, 2010), available 
at http://www.journalofaccountancy .com/W eb/20 103125 .htm. 
75 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round 11, 95 MINN. L. REv. 
1779 (2011). 
76 See id.; see also Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of Securities 
Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REv. 393 (2006); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack 
Corporate Governance, i 14 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005); Larry E. Ribstein? Bubble Laws, 40 Hou. L. REV. 77 {2003); 
Charles P. Kindleberger, i\1anias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises (4th ed. 2000). 
11 
sentiments. 77 During a bubble period, regulators and private gatekeepers tend to let their guard 
down and there is a boom in fraud as fraudsters see opportunities and investors become more 
greedy and trusting. 78 After a bubble bursts, investigators typically tum up evidence of 
speculative excess and even widespread fraud. 79 Then, investors burnt by losses from the 
bursting of the bubble and outraged by evidence of misconduct create populist pressure for new 
regulation. 80 ''It is in the post-bubble environment, when scandals and economic reversals occur 
and when corporate transactions grab the attention of the American public and the U.S. 
Congress, that Congress often acts."81 
Due to the upswing in populist anger and accompanying intense public pressure for 
action following the bursting of bubbles, post-bubble periods offer "windows of opportunity to 
well-positioned policy entrepreneurs to market their preferred, ready-made solutions when there 
is little time for reflective deliberation."82 Bubble laws tend to be adopted in a hurry and the 
pressure to act quickly benefits policy entrepreneurs who have pre-packaged purported solutions 
that can be readily adapted into legislative form. 83 Therefore, legislating in the immediate 
aftermath of a public scandal or crisis, as vvere the circumstances surrounding Dodd-Frank, is a 
formula for poor public policyrnaking; urgency prevents careful and balanced consideration of 
the issues, and instead facilitates ''a window for action by the better-positioned, not the better 
informed, policy entrepreneurs."84 
77 Bainbridge, supra note 76, at 1785. 
78 ld. 
79 Jd. 
80 Id.; see also Alice Bartoo, Comment on Prohibition against Conflicts of Interest in Certain Securitizations (Oct. 
11, 2011) (requesting the SEC "[p]Iease implement ... all the regulations of the Dodd-Frank [A]ct .... I would like 
to see some strength of leadership at correcting as many of [these] terrible, greedy and risky actions as possible."), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comrnents/s7-38-llls73811-4.htm. 
81 Jd. at 1786 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
82 !d. (quoting Romano, supra note 77, at 1590). 
83 Bainbridge, supra note 76, at 1786. 
84 Romano, supra note 77, at 1602. 
12 
Experts have independently demonstrated that this pattern of boom-bust-regulation is a 
reoccurring phenomenon in American law.85 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("SOX") and 
Dodd-Frank are just the latest iterations of this process. 86 Indeed, in describing the current 
situation, one commentator wrote, 
The Obama administration thinks it has discovered the perfect formula to cram 
legislation through in a hurry: Demonize some prominent finn within an industry 
you plan to redesign, and then pass a law that has nothing to do with the 
accusation against the demonized firm. They did this with health insurance and 
now they're trying it with fmance .... Today, the new demon de jour is Goldman 
Sachs, a handy scapegoat to promote hasty financial rejiggering schemes .... The 
SEC's dubious civil suit against Goldman is a wasteful diversion at best. It has 
nothing to do with the Obama administration's suicidal impulse to impose more 
tough regulations and taxes on banks to encourage them to lend more. 87 
In this case, Section 621 under Dodd-Frank was pooriy conceived and there is a disconnect 
between means and ends. A further analysis of ABS transactions suggests that the provision was 
seriously misconceived because it is unlikely to cure the central problems of the securitization 
markets or othervvise protect and benefit investors as Congress intended. 
III. WHY THE PROPOSED RULE DOES NOT SOLVE THE REAL PROBLEM 
Though conflicts of interest between those who structured ABS and their investors played 
a role in the CDO mdtdovv·:u, the conflicts ;;;,;ere m.u.ch less important iu the market failure than 
the assets underlying the instruments and transactions involved. The center of the problem for 
securitization markets was the widespread distribution of securities that were so complex that, 
due to a lack of transparency, they could not be valued accurately, which opened the door to 
fraud and abuse. The proscription in proposed Rule 127B fails to address these issues. 
85 See Ribstein, supra note 77, at 83-94; Romano, supra note 77, at 1590-94. 
86 Bainbridge, supra note 76, at 1786. 
87 Alan Reynolds, SEC vs. Goldman Sachs: Legislation by Demonization (Apr. 21, 2010), available ai 
http://www .cato-at-liberty .org/sec-vs-goldman-sachs-legislation-by-demonology /. 
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A. Complexity and the Credit Rating Agencies 
Although much attention has been given to the conflicts of interest, such as was involved 
in the ABACUS case, which can arise in the structured products market, of greater concern is 
that structured products are complex and as one commentator noted, "the more complex, the less 
understandable."88 Some products are composed of a complex set of risk ele1nents that are very 
difficult for investors to compile on their own.89 Others provide investors exposure to types of 
risks or markets that they could not invest in directly. 90 The correct price of even siinple 
structured products is difficult for many investors to determine on their own.91 To price 
structured products, investors need to have an understanding of the relationship among the 
various elements of a structure in order to accurately gauge the valuation impact of having those 
elements packaged together into a single product.92 Aside from pricing difficulties, investors 
often fail to fully appreciate the risk of loss they take when purchasing structured products. 93 
While an investor may generally understand the nature of the risk embedded in the product, the 
complexity of the structure may make it difficult to determine with any degree of precision how 
market movements will itnpact the product's value.94 Thus, the foundational concern regarding 
structured products is the potential inability of investors to properly price, or fully assess the 
embedded risks of, structured products. 95 
88 See Suzanne H. Shatto, Comment on Prohibition against Conflicts of Interest in Certain Securitizations (Oct. 8, 
2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-38-ll/s73811-3.htm. 
89 Bennett, supra note 109, at 814-15. 
90 ld. at 815. 
91 ld. 
92 !d. at 816. 
93 !d. 
94 !d. ("This difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that many products are structured to include a leverage factor that 
multiples the impact of any movement in the value of the underlying asset or index. For example, each one-
percentage point movement in the underlying index may produce a two or three percentage point change in the 
product's value. Leveraged products thereby increase the opportunity for gains, but also the likelihood that the 
investor will suffer significant losses."). 
95 Bennett, supra note 109, at 816. 
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The heart of the problem is that, due to the complexity of the products, unregulated 
ratings for ABS became proxies for the full disclosure required by securities law.96 When ABS 
were repackaged into complex CDOs or used indirectly to create derivative obligations such as 
CDSs, participants in transactions and institutions holding the securities relied on the high ratings 
given to component ABS rather than looking at the assets underlying them.97 The disclosures 
concerning these instruments failed to warn of weaknesses in the assets on which they rested. 98 
Over time, the CDO market's quality controls expanded beyond the scope of federal 
securities regulation which permitted irresponsible and fraudulent practices concerning financial 
instruments underlying ABS and their derivatives.99 Ratings by private rating agencies largely 
dispiaced the structured disclosure requirements of securities law as the primary basis for 
investors' purchase of the securities. 100 That rating system, full of rampant conflicts of interest 
as a product of the rating agencies getting paid by the issuers of the securities they rated, failed to 
detect the increasing risk in the debt instruments used as the collateral for the CDO system.101 
Originally, credit rating agencies 102 ('~CRAs") rated corporations, or their ability to repay 
particular debt securities, and earned revenues from investor subscriptions. 103 In the 1970s, the 
CRAs changed their business model to base their revenues on fees from issu.ers of securities that 
96 Richard E. Mendales, Collateralized Explosive Devices: Why Securities Regulation Failed to Prevent the CDO 
Meltdown, and How to Fix It, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1359, 1361 (2009). 
97 !d. at 1362. 
98 !d. 
99 !d. at 1363. 
100 !d. 
101 !d. 
102 The three most important agencies for purposes of the CDO market are Moody's, Standard & Poor's ("S&P"), 
and Fitch. As of2002, ~1oody's and S&P together had almost 80% ofthe global market share for rating securities; 
Fitch had 14%, and the remainder was scattered among smaller newcomers. See Challenging Times for Credit 
Ratings lvfonopoly, IRISH TIMES (Dec. 13, 2002), available at 
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/finance/2002/1213/i039700348175.html. 
103 ld.; see Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 43,49-50 (2004). 
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they rated; 104 this created a conflict of interest because it gave the CRAs a powerful incentive to 
. h . f: bl . 105 gtve t etr customers avora e ratings. In 1975, the SEC approved the use of ratings by 
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations ("NRSROs") to judge the quality of 
securities that broker-dealers could use to satisfy their capital requirements. 106 Subsequently, the 
SEC expanded the use of ratings to other areas as welL 107 Additionally, federal and state 
regulators, in establishing standards for institutions such as banks and insurance companies, 
began requiring that securities be top-rated to be counted toward minilnal capital 
requirements. 108 As a result of ratings becoming more widely used, ABS that were rated in the 
top rating categories were considered equivalent to securities issued or guaranteed by 
government-sponsored enterprises, even though the ABS lacked an express or implied federal 
guaranty. 109 
The creation of CDOs increased the complexity of certain ABS. 110 The layers between 
debt instruments providing the underlying cash flow for the instruments and the final instruments 
sold on the markets destroyed the transparency that the securities laws were designed to create, 
and made the unregulated rating system a substitute for due diligence in determining quality. 111 
To rate ABS, CRAs began with a '"loan tape" which described the characteristics of the included 
obligations. 1 12 CRAs were not, however, required to use due diligence to assure the validity of 
104 See Hill, supra note 137, at 50 ("The change in business model coincided with another change that made the 
agencies more important actors in the issuance of [ABSs]: government bodies, ironically led by the SEC, began to 
use the agencies' ratings to measure the quality of the securities held by regulated entities."). 
105 Mendales, supra note 132, at 1373. 
106 ld. at 1374. 
107 ld. (Such as regulations under the 1940 Act, under which taxable money market funds may not hold more than 
five percent of their assets in securities rated below the top tier ratings of at least two rating agencies.) 
108 ld. at 1375. 
109 ld. 
110 Mendales, supra note 132, at 1381. 
Ill Jd. 
I 12 Jd. 
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the infonnation on the loan tape.113 Then, in order to rate each particular tranche of a particular 
issue, CRAs applied their statistical models to the characteristics of each pool of obligations. 114 
Unlike ratings for typical corporate debt securities, investors could not easily double-check the 
balance sheet, income statement, and SEC filings designed to maximize transparency of an 
offering.115 To the contrary, the rating for a tranche of any CDO has been equated to a kind of 
Hblack box," which is not easily subject to analysis by purchasers. 116 Even sophisticated 
investment professionals have found that CDOs consisting of multiple types of obligations are 
impossible to value and have nothing to rely upon but the rating system. 1 17 
As ABS and their derivatives became more complex, transparency declined, and the 
market became even more dependent on the rating systern, with little concern for its accuracy. 118 
For example, ''[f]or a synthetic CDO based on derivative obligations resting on a pool of AAA-
rated [ABS], a purchaser was not in a good position to backtrack to determine whether the AAA 
ratings reflected consistent up-to-date statistical models applied correctly to underlying pools of 
well-documented obligations with known characteristics." 119 However, the CRAs did not 
perform due diligence to ensure adequate documentation for each mortgage in a pool, nor did 
they determine whether mortgages represented higher risks than ;vould be permitted u.ndcr 
II3 Jd. 
1141d. 
115 Jd. 
116 Mendales, supra note 132, at 1381. 
117 Louise Story, A Question of Value: What's an Asset Worth? It's Not Always Easy to Tell, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 
2008, at Cl (reporting that investment professionals were unable to value CDOs). 
118 Jd. at 1376. 
119 Roger Lowenstein, Triple-A Failure, N.Y. TIMES MAG., at 41 (Apr. 27, 2008) (A single offering may include 
tranches rated AAA (S&P's top investment-grade rating), tranches with lower but still investment-grade ratings, and 
tranches rated below investment grade. Because top-rated tranches enjoy the right to collections from all obligations 
in a pool before lower-rated tranches may receive anything, they may receive ratings indicating stronger payment 
ability than most - or even all - of the individual sources of cash flow in a pool. A mortgage-backed security may 
thus receive a top rating even though all the mortgages backing it are subprime ). 
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Ginnie Mae standards, 120 or whether the 1nortgages had qualitatively different characteristics 
making default almost certain. 121 Furthermore, due to a duopoly in rating ABS and their 
derivatives, Moody's and S&P were under no competitive pressure to update their statistical 
d 1 fl h . d. . 122 mo e s to re ect c ang1ng con 1t1ons. 
By not performing due diligence on the pools they were rating, the CRAs failed to 
recognize significant qualitative changes in the loans underlying the securities they rated; they 
also failed to change their statistical models based on the increasing complexity of ABS and 
changes in the housing market. 123 In the recent housing bubble, what were called "'subprime" 
loans did not fit the historic model of documented loans to mortgagors with a suspect credit 
history. 124 The subprime loans included loans to mortgagors with no equity and loans that were 
completely undocumented. 125 Therefore, the loans were prone to fraud by mortgagors who 
overstated their incomes and by bloated appraisals of mortgaged property, or they were time 
bombs due to reset at rates above the mortgagor's ability to pay. 126 These were not simply loans 
with a higher probability of default, they were loans with a near certainty of default. 127 In fact, 
the inadequacy of the rating system models vvas clear based on information available before the 
housing 1narket crash. 128 Top ratings, which are supposed to indicate a strong capacity to pay 
principal and interest, were inconsistent across different types of debt securities. 129 Under 
Moody's system, 2.2% of corporate bonds rated Baa (the lowest investment-grade rating) 
120 Ginnie Mae rules preclude it from guaranteeing pools of loans including characteristics such as significantly 
higher interest rates than those currently being paid on Ginnie Mae securities, or with refinancing built into the 
structure ofthe loans. Mendales, supra note 132, at note 129. 
121 Id. at 1377. 
122 !d. 
123 !d. at 1379-80. 
124 ld. at 1396. 
125 ld. 
126 Mendales, supra note 132, at 1396. 
127 !d. 
128 Jd. 
J:?Q ld. 
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defaulted for each five-year period from 1983-2005.13° For CDOs with the same rating, the 
average five-year default rate from 1993 to 2005 was 24%. 131 For municipal bonds with the 
same rating, the five-year default rate was only 0.097%. 132 
Prior to the meltdown, the CRAs were not required to disclose underlying information to 
which they applied their statistical models to rate a given ABS or CDO. 133 However, since the 
meltdown, the SEC has proposed new rules and amendments intended to increase transparency 
and improve the integrity of credit ratings. 134 The proposed rules would implement certain 
provisions of Dodd-Frank and enhance the SEC's existing rules governing credit ratings and 
NRSROs.135 Under the SEC's proposal, NRSROs would be required to: report on internal 
controls; protect against conflicts of interests; establish professional standards for credit analysts; 
publicly provide - along with the publication of the credit rating - disclosure about the credit 
rating and the methodology used to determine it; and enhance their public disclosures about the 
performance of their credit ratings. 136 The SEC's proposal also requires disclosure concerning 
third-party due diligence reports for ABS. 137 
It remains to be seen whether these measures will fully correct these foundational 
130 Richard Tomlinson & David Evans, The Ratings Charade, BLOOMBERG (July 2007), available at 
http://www .bloomberg.com/news/marketsmag/ratings.html. 
131 ld 
132 !d. 
133 Mendales, supra note 132, at 1382 (Interestingly, in 2007, well at-9:er the subprime default crisis had begun, 
Moody's announced that it was changing the model that it had adopted in 2002 to rate securities on subprime 
mortgages. Therefore, when the rating system failed, beginning with subprime mortgage defaults in 2006, not only 
private investors but even financial institutions around the world found it impossible to value the CDOs they held). 
134 SEC Press Release, SEC Proposes Rules to Increase Transparency and Improve Integrity of Credit Ratings (May 
18, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/20 11/20 ll-113.htm. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
19 
B. Dangers Associated with the Proposal's Proscription 
There is a danger that, concerning Dodd-Frank's Section 621, and now SEC Rule 127B, 
legislators adopted proposa]s of policy entrepreneurs without a careful consideration of the costs 
and consequences associated with the policy prescriptions. Unfortunately, because policy 
entrepreneurs tend to be critics of markets and corporations, bubble laws often do, and in this 
case may, "impose regulation that penalizes or outlaw·s potentially useful devices and practices 
and more generally discourages risk-taking by punishing negative results and reducing the 
rewards for success." 138 The proposed prohibition of certain securitization transactions and 
structures could unduly stifle the free flow of capital, constrain market participants in managing 
their risks, frustrate capital formation, and cut investors off from investment opportunities. 139 
Some commentators are worried that proposed Rule 127B's prohibition 1nay prove to be over-
inclusive, banning more than is called for- the proposal may characterize a ••material conflict of 
interest" too expansively and the proposal may implement the statutory exceptions for hedging 
activities, liquidity commitments, and market making too narrowly. 140 These concerns should be 
heeded. If not properly tailored, proposed Rule 127B and the prohibition it sets forth may prove 
to unduly restrain a beneficial financial mechanism. 
If the government proscribed or banned transactions for which information asymmetry 
exceeded a certain level, one of the most immediate potential consequences would be the 
elimination of many, if not most, structured transactions. 141 Stn1ctured transactions are widely 
138 Bainbridge, supra note 76, at 1787 (quoting Ribstein, supra note 77, at 83). 
139 See Speech by SEC Commissioner Troy Paredes, Statement at Open j'vfeeting to Propose Rule Amendments to 
Prohibit Conflicts of Interest in Certain Securitizations (Sept. 19, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/20 11/spch091911 tap.htm. 
140 !d. 
141 Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. I, 21 
(2004). 
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used and accepted. 142 Often structured transactions are efficient means of obtaining funding for 
their participants while also achieving various accounting, tax and regulatory benefits. 143 They 
reflect the innovation for which the US capital markets are known, have many legitimate uses, 
and comprise a significant part of the US capital markets. 144 These types of transactions are 
efficient because they serve to transfer investment risks to those who have the most expertise, or 
the most willingness to invest, in the risks. 145 Indeed, securitization transactions are normally 
viewed as socially desirable. 146 Even despite the subprime mortgage crisis, there is evidence that 
securitization has still created overall value in the financial markets. 147 
Another reason that the government should not proscribe transactions as a means of 
controlling inforrnation asymrnetry is that any such bans may create "regulatory arbitrage 
incentives" in which parties would aspire to structure transactions in ways that appear to meet 
regulatory requirements. 148 The consequences of such actions would be undesirable: the 
regulatory proscription would be bypassed and the transaction costs would rise due to added 
expenses of lawyers and other advisors hired to help structure the transaction. 149 For these 
142 In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (AJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2002) (First Interim Report ofNeal Batson, 
Court-Appointed Examiner), at 22 (noting, for example, that "total outstanding mortgage-backed and asset-backed 
securities in the United States alone exceed $6 trillion"), available at 
http://www.enron.com/corp/por/pdfs/InterimReportlofExaminer.pdf. 
143 /d. 
144 !d. 
145 Schwarcz, supra note 142, at 21 ("There is usually a panoply of risks associated with any given originator. In a 
securitization, for example, the originator separates particular financial assets from those risks by selling or 
otherwise transferring those assets to a '"bankruptcy-remote" SPE. Investors in the SPE can, therefore, base their 
investment decisions solely on the risks associated with the transferred assets. Moreover, even those limited risks 
can be borne by providers of credit enhancement or investors in subordinated securities, parties who are in the 
business of precisely assessing and absorbing such risks. As a result, the universe of investors interested in 
investing in those assets greatly expands"). 
146 Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure's Failure in the Subprime 1\1/ortgage Crisis, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1109, 1118 
(2008). 
147 !d.; see Xudong An, Yongheng Deng & Stuart A. Gabriel, Value Creation Through Securitization: Evidence 
from the CMBS Market (Feb. 18, 2008) (SSRN working paper no. 1 095645). 
148 Schwarcz, supra note 142, at 22. 
149 !d. 
21 
reasons, the proscription of structured transactions may be unwise and may yield undesired 
results. 
Some commentators question why banks were even allowed to create and sell products 
like the synthetic CDO at the center of the GS&Co ABACUS case. 150 And, in the same vein, 
they wonder what purpose a synthetic CDO, which contains no actual mortgage bonds, serves for 
the capital markets, and for society. 151 Additionally, critics argue that since buyers and sellers of 
CDSs often have no stake in the underlying instrument, such swaps function like an insurance 
policy. 152 One party collects a fee for promising to, essentially, insure a bond; the other party 
makes the premium payments, and gets a big payoff if the bond goes bad. 153 The proble1n, some 
say, is that swaps are open to anyone, including parties vvith nothing to insure. 154 Therefore, 
allowing speculators to bet on entities in which they have no stake is similar to "letting your 
neighbor take out an insurance policy on your life."i 55 In the end, critics argue, the CDOs 
involved in the GS&Co trades, "were simply a side bet - like those in a casino - that allowed 
speculators to increase society's mortgage wager without financing a single house." 156 However, 
contrary to these views, structured products remain an important investment tool for both retail 
and institutional investors. 157 
A more detailed description of securitization is essential to better understand the benefits 
that the above mentioned instruments provide to financial markets. The SEC describes 
securitization as: a financing technique in which financial assets, in many cases illiquid, are 
pooled and converted into instruments that are offered and sold in the capital markets as 
150 See Andrew Ross Sorkin, When Deals on Wall Street Resemble a Casino Wager, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2010). 
151 !d. 
152 See Roger Lowenstein, Gambling With the Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2010). 
153 !d. 
154 ld. 
155 ld. 
156 !d. 
157 See Sorkin, supra note 91. 
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securities. 158 This fmancing technique makes it easier for lenders to exchange payment streams 
coming from loans, or other pooled assets, for cash allowing them to make additional loans or 
credit available to a wide range of borrowers and companies seeking financing. 159 As a result of 
securitization, the credit and other risks associated with the pooled assets are transferred away 
from the sponsor's balance sheet to investors in the ABS. 160 
Over the years, the securitization process significantly evolved. 161 There are now 
synthetic ABS in which investors in securities issued by special purpose entities162 ('"SPE") 
acquire credit exposure to a portfolio of fixed income assets without the SPE owning these 
assets. 163 The investors gain this exposure because the SPE has entered into derivatives 
transactions, such as CDSs that reference particular assets. 164 The counterparly" to the CDS n1ay 
be the sponsor who originated or selected the underlying portfolio. 165 The SPE, as seller of 
protection under the CDS, is in effect long the credit exposure on those assets as if it had 
purchased them. 166 
158 Asset-Backed Securities, SEC Release No. 33-9117 (Apr. 7, 2010), 75 FR 23328,23329 (May 3, 2010) (Some of 
the types of assets that are financed today through securitization include residential and commercial mortgages, 
agricultural equipment leases, automobile loans and leases, student loans and credit card receivables). 
159 ~ 1 Ja_ 
160 See SEC Release, supra note 39, at 60321 (one type of ABS is a CDO). 
161 Jd. 
162 See id. (a financial institution or other entity, commonly known as a sponsor, first originates or acquires a pool of 
financial assets. The sponsor then sells the financial assets, directly or through an affiliate, to a special purpose 
entity. The SPE issues the securities supported or "backed" by the financial assets. These securities are then sold to 
investors). 
163 !d. 
164 !d. 
165 !d. 
166 SEC Release, supra note 39, at 60321 (To illustrate, a bank that maintains fixed income assets on its balance 
sheet may protect itself against default of those assets by purchasing a CDS from the SPE that references the same 
or similar types of assets. In other cases, a person may desire to purchase CDS protection even though such person 
does not own the reference assets underlying the CDS sold by the SPE. In both of these cases, the SPE, as seller of 
the CDS protection, takes on the risk of default on the reference assets underlying the CDS (and the consequent 
obligation to make a payment to the CDS counterparty as a result of such default) in exchange for ongoing payments 
from the purchaser of the CDS protection. Additionally, in both scenarios any payments the SPE is required to 
make under the CDS will be funded from amounts received by the SPE from the investors in the ABS issued by the 
SPE. Hence, the proceeds ofthe SPE's issuance of securities typically are not used to purchase loa.t!s, receivables or 
other investment assets, but instead are typically used to purchase highly creditworthy co11atera1 to support ( 1) the 
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In both the non-synthetic ABS and the synthetic ABS, the SPE and the investors in the 
SPE have an ongoing long exposure to each instrument in a reference pool of assets - assets held 
directly by the SPE, in the case of a non-synthetic transaction, or assets referenced in a CDS 
under ·which the SPE has sold protection to a counterparty, in the case of a synthetic 
transaction. 167 However, the transactions differ in that the synthetic transaction inherently 
involves a party- the counterparty to the CDS -that has purchased CDS protection on the same 
reference pool of assets and thus has an ongoing short exposure to those assets. 168 This 
purchaser of CDS protection may be a securitization participant - such as the bank sponsoring 
the synthetic ABS. 169 In these transactions, and considering the CDS in isolation, the 
securitization participant would be taking an investment position that is directionally opposite to 
that taken by the investors in the synthetic ABS, as is generally the case in any transaction 
through which a buyer is able to acquire and a seller is able to dispose of a particular financial 
exposure in pursuit of their respective investment objectives. 170 If the referenced assets default, 
the securitization participant receives a payment from the SPE pursuant to the CDS and the 
investors in the SPE ultimately suffer a loss on their investment. 171 If the referenced assets do 
not default, the investors would have benefited from payments from the CDS counterparty while 
the SPE would not have any payment obligations to the CDS counterparty. 172 
With respect to a particular structured product, the fact that a dealer responsible for the 
structuring of the product and an investor were on opposite sides of the embedded derivative 
SPE's contingent obligation to pay the purchaser of the CDS in the event of one or more defaults with respect to the 
reference assets underlying the CDS (the synthetic reference pool of assets), and (2) to the extent not used for 
payments to the CDS purchaser, the SPE's obligations to investors in the SPE's issued securities. The SPE makes 
payments to investors based on cash flows and proceeds from the CDS and the collateral pool). 
167 !d. at 60322. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 ld. 
171 ld. 
172 SEC Release, supra note 39, at 60322. 
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was, for most of the history of the structured products market, seen as a natural economic fact, 
not a conflict of interest. 173 Structured product professionals believe that it is natural for a bank 
to create a CDO by shorting the underlying reference portfolio, and standard that it would offset 
part of that short position with a client. 174 A CDO cannot exist "vithout parties 'Willing to short 
the reference portfolio because, as mentioned above, their payments fund the payments made to 
the investors. 175 Investors can only take a long position in a synthetic CDO if someone else is 
willing to go short. 176 It is a common and almost essential element of creating a structured 
product for a dealer to take the opposite position from the investors in a structured product. 177 
However, the fact that the dealer may profit to the same extent as the investors' loss if the 
investors iose on a transaction creates the appearance of a conflict. 178 No matter how distasteful 
this may seem, in and of itself, this outcome is not impermissible and is simply a fundamental 
reality regarding structured products. 
Synthetic CDOs facilitate the management of risk and the flow of capital. 179 Meanwhile, 
banks that have lent money to questionable borrowers use CDSs as a hedge - if the loans go bad, 
the bank makes up for the loss by collecting on the CDS. 180 As mentioned above, a major source 
uf vriii'-iiMu i:; that fiuaudal ii1stitutious took risky "bets" in synthetic CDOs. That is, instead of 
using derivatives to hedge, institutions took positions in synthetic CDOs with the intention of 
173 Michael Benne~ Complexity and Its Discontents: Recurring Legal Concerns with Structured Products, 7 N.Y.U. 
J. L. & Bus. 811, 829 (2011). 
174 Id. at 830. 
175 !d. 
176 !d. ("This is a non-scandal. ... Synthetic CDOs cannot exist unless somebody is betting that they will lose value. 
In such a zero-sum contes~ big investors who went long knew perfectly well that other investors had to be taking the 
other side of the bet") 
177 !d. at 831. 
178 !d. 
179 Sorkin, supra note 91. 
180 Lowenstein, supra note 93. 
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earning Jong-terrn growth. 181 While s01ne firms made money, many others lost vast sums when 
their derivative bets went wrong. 182 However, derivatives are not intended to be a growth-
enhancing investment. 183 
Unlike investments in assets, derivatives are contracts that involve "parties" and 
''counterparties," and one party's gain is another party's loss. 184 Theoretically, with a large 
enough pool of CDSs, the amount the short position pays to the long position exactly equals the 
sum total of credit defaults that the long position pays to the short position. 185 The objective in 
designing a CDS is to ensure that at the outset the net present value of all exchanges of the 
payments to be made by both sides will equal zero. 186 When used properly, derivatives allow 
companies to hedge cash flow risk, allowing it to continue its investments. 187 If derivatives are 
used to hedge risk, they can help bring regularity and certainty to a company's cash flow, which 
may be used for investment and growth. 188 The core problem with the GS&Co ABACUS CDO, 
and other structured finance transactions, was that "investors relied on flawed assessments of 
risk." 189 
181 Nocera, supra note 69. 
182 Deckant, supra note 1, at 426; see also Sebastian Mallaby, In SEC vs. Goldman, who's really at fault?, 
Washington Post (Apr. 21, 2010) ("[t]his is a non-scandal. The securities in question, so-called synthetic CDOs, 
cannot exist unless somebody is betting that they wi11 lose value. In such a zero-sum contest, big investors who 
went long knew perfectly well that other investors had to be taking the other side of the bet. [GS&Co] lost $90 
mil1ion by betting [ABACUS] would go up; [Paulson] went short."). 
183 ld. 
184 !d. 
185 Id. 
186 ld. 
187 See Kenneth A. Froot, DavidS. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, A Framework for Risk Management, HARV. Bus. 
REV. (1994). 
188 See id. (the role of risk management is to ensure that a company has the cash available to make value-enhancing 
investments). 
189 Sorkin, supra note 91 (4uoting Sean Egan, managing director of Egan-Jones Ratings). 
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IV. THE CASE FOR INCLUDING A "ROLE FOR DISCLOSURE" 
Proposed Rule 127B does not include a role for disclosure. A major concern is that when 
a transaction or structure is banned under the proposed rule, investors may be forced to pass on 
investment opportunities that they might otherwise welcome if given the opportunity to make an 
informed choice. 190 One way to prevent sacrificing investor choice in the context of the 
proposed rule could be to allow for disclosure to remedy what the rule would otherwise treat as a 
prohibited material conflict of interest.191 Such a response would fit into the traditional scheme 
of federal securities law which favors disclosure, allowing investors to make their own 
investment decisions as they wish with the benefit of the information provided for them. 192 The 
federal securities laws depend on disclosure, not institutional constraints, following Justice 
Brandeis's observation that "sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants," rather than judging 
the merit of registered securities. 193 If, given a choice, an investor were to decide to transact in 
the face of a properly identified and adequately disclosed conflict of interest, Rule 127B should 
not block the investor from the investor's preferred investment. 194 Government decision making, 
as effectuated through a ban on certain transactions and structures should not displace informed 
ABS, other than those expressly exempted from registration under the securities laws, are 
subject to the full disclosure requirements for securities issued for sale to the general public. 196 
Although it is possible to privately place such securities and side-step the full disclosure required 
by the securities la\-vs, a key purpose of securitization is, as elaborated above, turning illiquid 
190 Paredes, supra note 140. 
191 ld. 
192 ld. 
193 Mendales, supra note 132, at 1363. 
194 Paredes, supra note 140. 
195 ld. 
196 See generally Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. §229 (2008). 
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assets into readily tradable instruments, and privately placed securities are not freely tradable. 197 
Therefore, securitization participants generally provide disclosures to investors in ABS, which 
should include adequate disclosure as to material conflicts of interest between investors and the 
securitization participant. 198 However, as argued above, these conflicts of interests, although 
having an appearance of impropriety, are not the causes of the foundational issues regarding 
securitization, ABS, and CDOs. 
Section 28 of the Securities Act provides the SEC with the authority to adopt conditional 
or unconditional exe1nptive rules and regulations "to the extent that such exemption is necessary 
or appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent with the protection of investors."199 
Discussed at length above, ABS and their derivatives are useful; they provide liquidity for 
housing-based lending and for other types of securitized debt, and can be used effectively as 
hedging strategies.200 Thus, an effective response must preserve the advantages of the system 
while addressing the underlying flaws that led to the crisis.201 Being that the new rules and 
regulations, proposed under Dodd-Frank, concerning the CRAs seek to redress the informational 
inadequacies surrounding ABS, it appears that in most circumstances, material conflicts of 
interest that would be prohibited under proposed Rule 127B can be adequately addressed through 
a conditional exemption.202 Therefore, the SEC should require disclosure, as a condition to an 
exemption, to allow securitization participants to engage in what otherwise would be prohibited 
behavior under the proposed rule.203 
197 Mendales, supra note 132, at 1382. 
198 SEC Release, supra note 39, at 60343. 
199 15 U.S.C. 77z-3. 
200 Mendales, supra note 132, at 1406. 
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Another approach would be to tolerate insufficient disclosure. Under this approach, 
disclosure would remain the sole remedy for any informational asymmetry between an originator 
and investors.204 Supporters of this approach believe that in an efficient market, stock prices 
virtually instantaneously reflect all publicly available information relevant to the value of the 
traded securities; thus, not all investors need to understand any given disclosure.205 However, 
complexity undermines the assumptions of this approach. With complexity, few, if any, 
investors will actually understand even detailed disclosures regarding complex instruments in 
order to act instantaneously and achieve an efficient market. 206 
Perhaps supplemental protections, in addition to, not in place of, disclosure can be used 
• • .. • ,'j • .. .. ~ .• 1... ?07 1'1""'1 • • ,r. 'Ill .. ... .. • ., .1 to minimiZe tne asymmetnc tnrormanon prootem.-- · .tor Instance, rraua m connecuon wnn me 
sale of mortgages or other nonsecuritized debt obligations has historically been subject to state 
law ?08 Being that these sales are now largely made for the purpose of securitization, fraud in 
such transactions should be subject to uniform federal regulation. 209 If this were so, any material 
misrepresentation regarding a CDO or the collateral underlying it would give rise to civil actions, 
by the SEC and also by private investors who purchase a CDO in reliance on the 
Furthermore, any sale of a debt instrument with knowledge that it would be securitized, 
accompanied by any material misrepresentation concerning the instrument sold, should be a 
violation of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.212 Such remedy would seem 
204 Schwarcz, supra note i 42, at 17. 
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to fit the GS&Co ABACUS circumstances well, which, "for all the trumpeting in the press about 
an impenetrable sophisticated transaction, in the end boils down to a claim of a garden variety 
fraud: Goldman misstated the tn1e nature of Paulson's involvement, thereby misleading those 
who bet the value of the securities would rise."213 
V. Conclusion 
Proposed SEC Rule 127B must be implemented carefully for fear of hampering the 
securitization markets. As a product of crisis legislation, the proposal was misconceived and, as 
proposed, is improperly tailored. The proposal does not address the real failures underlying the 
financial mechanism in question, namely, complexity of modem ABS and synthetic CDOs and 
the failure of the CRAs to perform adequate due diligence to ensure that their ratings were 
accurate. In light of new rules and regulations under Dodd-Frank aimed at redressing the 
integrity and accuracy deficiencies regarding the credit rating syste1n, the prohibition under Rule 
127B is sure to create unnecessary restrictions on asset-backed securitization markets and will be 
detrimental to the healthy functioning of the securitization markets. Investors would be better 
protected and served by the incorporation of a role for disclosure to the proposed rule which 
would minimize the potential harmful effects and undue cost of the proposed rule's prohibition. 
213 Norman A. Olch, SEC v. Goldman Sachs: Read the Complaint, FULL COURT PASS (Apr. 20, 201 0), available at 
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